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Abstract: Il ricorso all’art. 25 DSU per superare la crisi dell’Organo d’appello dell’OMC: 
la proposta dell’Unione europea per una procedura arbitrale d’appello temporanea – At 
midnight of 10 December 2019, the WTO Appellate Body ceased to be operational, as the US 
has been vetoing since May 2016 the selections of the members of the World Trade Court. 
The WTO dispute settlement system hence risks the paralysis -a scenario that could 
materialize should the losing party of a panel report appeal the latter “into the void,” i.e. before 
an Appellate Body with less than three judges. In response to this event, the European Union 
is developing an articulated approach to guarantee a rule-based international trade system 
and the principle of cooperation as the pillars of the governance of the global economy. One 
element of the EU approach is the initiative for an interim appeal arbitration procedure based 
on Article 25 of the DSU, and the present work is devoted to the analysis of this contingency 
remedy. 
Summary: 1. Introduction – 2. Arbitration within the multilateral trade system: from GATT 
1947 until Article 25 of the DSU – 3. The Interim Appeal Arbitration Agreement based on 
Article 25 of the DSU proposed by the European Union – 4. Reactions of the WTO 
membership to the EU ad hoc arbitration proposal – 5. Conclusions 
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1. Introduction  
As it is well known, and most unfortunate, since May 20161 the United States has 
been blocking appointments of the members of Appellate Body (AB) of the World 
 
1 See WT/DSB/M/379, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Center William Rappard on 23 May 
2016, 29 August 2016, at paras. 6.2 – 6.10 reporting why the United States could not be able 
to accept the reappointment of Mr. Seung Wha Chang for a second four-year term; 
WT/DSB/M/400, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Center William Rappard on 31 August 2017, 
31 October 2017, where it is recorded the US position of blocking any new appointment of 
AB members until the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) did not consider the serious systemic 
implications of former appellate judges still serving as adjudicators after their term in office 
ended (on the basis of Rule 15 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, see 
WT/AB/WP/6, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, 16 August 2010); see also the US 
President 2018 Trade Policy Agenda, where the US administration finally articulated the full 
list of criticisms on the Appellate Body practice and case-law (Office of the United States 
Trade Representative, The President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda, March 2018, at pages 22-28), 
which were then constantly reported by the US diplomats in their official statements before 
the DSB (cfr. e.g. WT/DSB/M/417, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Center William Rappard 
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Trade Organization (WTO).2 Such an approach provoked the most serious 
institutional crisis of the multilateral trade system3 as significantly and deeply 
renovated, widened and deepened by the 1986 – 1993 Uruguay Round.4 In fact, at 
midnight of 10 December 2019, when the mandates of two of the three remaining 
judges expired,5 what has been qualified as “the most successful appellate 
 
on 27 August 2018, 30 November 2018, paras. 4.2 – 4.17; WT/DSB/M/420, Minutes of the 
Meeting Held in the Center William Rappard on 29 October 2018, 27 February 2019, paras. 4.2 – 
4.19; WT/DSB/M/426, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Center William Rappard on 25 
February 2019, 20 May 2019, para. 5.26). 
2 See the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, in World Trade 
Organization, The Legal Texts - The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011, p. 4 ff. 
3 The blockage of the Appellate Body and the reasons brought by the US for its approach have 
been extensively commented: see inter alia G. Adinolfi, Procedural Rules in WTO Dispute 
Settlement in the Face of the Crisis of the Appellate Body, in Questions of International Law, 2019, p. 
39 ff.; J. Bacchus, Might Unmakes Right: The American Assault on the Rule of Law in World Trade, 
CIGI Paper No. 173, May 2018; E. Baroncini, Il funzionamento dell'Organo d'appello dell'OMC: 
bilancio e prospettive, Bologna, 2018; K. Claussen, The Other Trade War, in Minnesota Law 
Review Headnotes, 2018, p. 1 ff.; C.D. Creamer, Can International Trade Law Recover? From the 
WTO’s Crown Jewel to its Crown of Thorns, in AJIL Unbound, 2019, p. 51 ff.; M. Fiorini, B. 
Hoekman, P. Mavroidis, M. Saluste, R. Wolfe, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Appellate Body 
Crisis: Insider Perceptions and Members’ Revealed Preferences, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2019; J. 
Hillman, Independence at the Top of the Triangle: Best Resolution of the Judicial Trilemma, in AJIL 
Unbound, 2017, p. 364 ff.; B. Hoekman, P. Mavroidis, Burning Down the House? The Appellate 
Body in the Centre of the WTO Crisis, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2019/56; B. Hoekman, P. 
Mavroidis, Party Like It’s 1995: Necessary but not Sufficient to Resolve WTO Appellate Body Crisis, 
in Vox, 26 August 2019; J. Hillman, Three Approaches to Fixing the World Trade Organization’s 
Appellate Body: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly?, IIEL Issues Brief, December 2018; R. 
McDougall, Impasse in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body: Consequences and Responses, ECIPE 
Policy Brief no. 11/2018; R. McDougall, Crisis in the WTO – Restoring the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Function, CIGI Papers no. 194, October 2018; R. McDougal, The Crisis in WTO 
Dispute Settlement: Fixing Birth Defects to Restore Balance, in Journal of World Trade, 2018, p. 
867 ff.; R. McDougall, Revitalizing the WTO: Settling Trade Disputes in a Turbulent Multipolar 
World, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2019; T. Payosova, G.C. Hufbauer, J.J. Schott, The Dispute 
Settlement Crisis in the World Trade Organization: Causes and Cures, PIIE Policy Brief No. 18-5, 
March 2018; J. Pauwelyn, WTO Dispute Settlement Post 2019: What to Expect?, in Journal of 
International Economic Law, 2019, p. 297 ff.; E.-U. Petersmann, Between “Member-Driven” WTO 
Governance and “Constitutional Justice”: Judicial Dilemmas in GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, in 
Journal of International Economic Law, 2018, p. 103 ff.; E.-U. Petersmann, How Should the EU 
and Other WTO Members React to their WTO Governance and WTO Appellate Body Crises?, EUI 
Working Papers, RSCAS 2018/71; E.-U. Petersmann, The “Crown Jewel” of the WTO Has Been 
Stolen by US Trade Diplomats – and They Have No Intention of Giving It Back, in D. Prévost, I. 
Alexovičocá, J. Hillebrand Pohl (Eds.), Restoring Trust in Trade, Liber Amicorum in Honour of 
Peter Van den Bossche, Oxford, 2019, p. 106 ff.; J.J. Schott, The United States Relies on the WTO 
to Settle Trade Disputes More Than Any Other Member, PIIE Charts, January 2019: G. Sacerdoti, 
The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Consolidating Success and Confronting New Challenges, in M. 
Elsig, B. Hoekman, J. Pauwelyn (Eds.), Assessing the World Trade Organization, Cambridge, 
2017, p. 147 ff.; G. Sacerdoti, The WTO Dispute Settlement System and the Challenges to 
Multilateralism: Consolidating a “Common Global Good”, in D. Prévost, I. Alexovičocá, J. 
Hillebrand Pohl (Eds.), Restoring Trust in Trade, Liber Amicorum in Honour of Peter Van den 
Bossche, Oxford, 2019, p. 87 ff.; T.P. Stewart, The Broken Multilateral Trade Dispute System, Asia 
Society Policy Institute, Feb. 7, 2018.  
4 For a complete overview of the Uruguay Round results see P. Mengozzi (Ed.), International 
Trade Law on the 50th Anniversary of the Multilateral Trade System, Milano, 1999.  
5 They are Mr. Ujal Singh Bhatia (India) and Mr. Thomas R. Graham (United States), who 
were serving as members of the Appellate Body since 11 December 2011. 
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mechanism in international history”6 has been finally paralysed: the WTO 
Permanent Tribunal needs at least three members to hear cases, each appellate 
adjudicatory section having to be composed by three judges,7 but now there is only 
one judge left, Ms. Zhao Hong (China), whose mandate will be over by 30 
November 2020.8 
The Appellate Body cannot anymore be operational until the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB)9 expresses its positive consensus10 on a sufficient number 
of new appellate adjudicators.11 The WTO dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) 
thus seriously runs the risk of falling back of seventy years, to the GATT 1947 
system, where the unsuccessful party of a panel could impede the adoption of a 
report by exercising its veto power when that report was put on the agenda for 
approval by the GATT 1947 Council:12 under the Marrakech Agreements, 
characterized by the reverse consensus decision mechanism for the DSB approval 
 
6 Statement delivered by Professor James Crawford, judge at the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), in the interview given to R. Mizen, “Back to Square One” if WTO Appeals Body Fails: 
Judge James Crawford, in Financial Review, 3 August 2018, available at 
www.afr.com/news/economy/trade/back-to-square-one-if-wto-appeals-body-fails-judge-
james-crawford-20180802-h13hz0 (access on 11 February 2019). 
7 See Article 17.1 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes (DSU): “A standing Appellate Body shall be established by the DSB. The Appellate 
Body shall hear appeals from panel cases. It shall be composed of seven persons, three of whom 
shall serve on any one case. Persons serving on the Appellate Body shall serve in rotation. Such 
rotation shall be determined in the working procedures of the Appellate Body,” emphasis 
added. The text of the DSU is available in World Trade Organization, The Legal Texts - The 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, cit., p. 354 ff..  
8 Not without a trace of irony, it has been underlined that on 13 December 2019 the WTO 
Secretariat circulated the communication that “the Members of the Appellate Body have 
elected Ms Zhao Hong to serve as Chair of the Appellate Body as of 1 December 2019 until 
30 November2020.” See WT/DSB/78, Election of the Chair of the Appellate Body – 
Communication from the Appellate Body, 13 December 2019.  
9 The DSB is the WTO political body conferred with the power of administering the dispute 
settlement mechanism, as established by Article 2 of the DSU: “the DSB shall have the 
authority to establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance 
of implementation of rulings and recommendations, and authorize suspension of concessions 
and other obligations under the covered agreements.” 
10 Pursuant to Article 17.2 of the DSU, “[t]he DSB shall appoint persons to serve on the 
Appellate Body for a four-year term, and each person may be reappointed once,” and has the 
duty to fill vacancies “as they arise.” When selecting the judges of the Appellate Body, the 
DSB has to deliberate by positive consensus, which means that “no Member, present at the 
meeting of the DSB when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision” 
(Article 2.4 of the DSU, footnote 1).  
11 As just illustrated, the Appellate Body needs a minimum of three members to deliver its 
adjudicatory activity. On the paralysis of the World Economic Court see the recent comments 
by G. Di Donfrancesco, Intervista a Giorgio Sacerdoti: “Per colpa degli Stati Uniti la WTO non è 
più arbitro del commercio,” in Il Sole 24 Ore, 11 December 2019; S. Nebehay, U.S. Seals Demise of 
WTO Appeals Bench: Trade Officials, Reuters, 9 December 2019; V. Hughes, What’s Next for the 
WTO?, Bennetjones.com, 12 December 2019; K.J. Pelc, J. Pauwelyn, The WTO’s Trade Dispute 
Appeal System Could End on Dec. 10. Here’s What You Need to Know, The Washington Post, 5 
December 2019; N. Poitiers, High Noon at the Appellate Body, Bruegel.org, 9 December 2019. 
12 For an analysis of the GATT 1947 dispute settlement mechanism and its evolution into the 
current WTO DSM cfr. A. Ligustro, Le controversie tra Stati nel diritto del commercio 
internazionale: dal GATT all’OMC, Padova, 1996.  
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of panel and Appellate Body reports, as well as the suspensions of concessions,13 
Article 16.4 of the DSU confers each disputant with the right to an appeal review,14 
so that a WTO Member losing panel proceedings could impede the adoption of 
the panel report by appealing the latter “into the void,” i.e. exercising its right of 
appeal in front of a WTO Permanent Tribunal having less than three judges. 
Faced with such an unprecedented multilateral challenge, the European 
Union (EU) chose to be a major international actor in the WTO reform process, 
indicating that “solving the Appellate Body crisis [is] a priority” for her.15 The 
EU has therefore developed an articulated strategy to deal with the blocking of 
the World Trade Court, a strategy based on four elements. Firstly, at the end of 
November 2018, the EU tabled two very interesting institutional proposals to 
revise the text of the DSU and provide with a formal and appropriate answer each 
of the critiques the US made on the Appellate Body activity,16 and guarantee the 
independence and impartiality of the World Trade Court.17 Secondly, in order to 
 
13 Reverse consensus means that the request for the establishment of a panel, the panel and 
Appellate Body reports, and the request for suspension of concessions may be rejected by the 
DSB only provided that the latter “decides by consensus not to adopt” them. See Articles 6.1, 
16.4, 17.14, and 22.6 of the DSU. The approval of the constitution of a panel, the 
recommendations and findings of WTO adjudicators, as well as the trade sanctions in case of 
no implementations of panel and AB reports is therefore quasi-automatic. On the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanisms see inter alia G. Adinolfi, La soluzione delle controversie, in G. 
Venturini (Ed.), L’Organizzazione mondiale del commercio, Milano, 2015, p. 304 ff.; M. 
Distefano, Soluzione delle controversie nell’OMC e diritto internazionale, Padova, 2001; A. 
Ligustro, P. Picone, Diritto dell’Organizzazione mondiale del commercio, Padova, 2002. 
14 “Within 60 days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the Members, the report 
shall be adopted at a DSB meeting unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of 
its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report. If a party has 
notified its decision to appeal, the report by the panel shall not be considered for adoption by 
the DSB until after completion of the appeal. This adoption procedure is without prejudice to 
the right of Members to express their views on a panel report.” 
15 See the Background Brief of 22 May 2019 for the Foreign Affairs Council – Trade Issues of 27 
May 2019, at p. 2, available at the link www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39454/background-
fac-trade_en.pdf. 
16 The US accuses the Appellate Body of i) persistent overreaching, i.e. of interpreting WTO 
law beyond its text; ii) delivering advisory opinions by intervening on issues not necessary to 
resolve a dispute; iii) asserting that appellate reports have the value of precedent for future 
panels, although WTO Members did not agree on a system based on the stare decisis principle; 
iv) reviewing panel findings of fact and considering panel findings on municipal law as legal 
issues rather than issues of fact, thus infringing Article 17.6 of the DSU; v) constantly 
disregarding Article 17,5 of the DSU, pursuant to which appellate proceedings “[i]n no case 
shall … exceed 90 days,” as the World Trade Court systematically delays the delivery of its 
reports; vi) too often applying Rule 15 of the Working Procedures of Appellate Review, thus 
illegitimately allowing a person who has ceased to be an Appellate Body member to continue 
deciding appeals even if his/her term has not been extended by the DSB. On these highly 
important and sensitive issues see C. Lo, J. Nakagawa, T. Chen (Eds.), The Appellate Body of 
the WTO and its Reform, Springer, Heidelberg, 2019; J. Lehne, Crisis at the WTO: Is the Blocking 
of Appointments to the WTO Appellate Body by the United States Legally Justified?, Berlin – Berne, 
2019; W. Zhou, H. Gao, “Overreaching” or “Overreacting”? Reflections on the Judicial Function 
and Approaches of WTO Appellate Body, in Journal of World Trade, 2019, p. 951 ff. 
17 Cfr. WT/GC/W/752, Communication from the European Union, China, Canada, India, Norway, 
New Zealand, Switzerland, Australia, Republic of Korea, Iceland, Singapore and Mexico to the 
General Council, 23 November 2018, and WT/GC/W/753, Communication from the European 
Union, China and India to the General Council, 23 November 2018. These two communications 
have been highly considered by Ambassador David Walker, appointed by the General Council 
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ensure a rule-based international trade in case of blockage of the WTO DSM, the 
EU activated the dispute settlement mechanisms of her free trade agreements, 
filing complaints with South-Korea over labour commitments,18 with Ukraine 
over the wood export ban of the European Eastern country,19 and with the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) over safeguard measures affecting trade 
in poultry.20 Thirdly, in summer 2019, the EU took the lead in Geneva for the 
setting up of an interim appeal arbitration capable of guaranteeing to the 
Marrakech system a dispute settlement mechanism still functioning with a two-
level of judgement and preserving the WTO case-law and procedures until the 
severe Appellate Body deadlock is overcome;21 and, fourthly, in December 2019, 
the European Commission unveiled a proposal reviewing the existing EU 
Enforcement Regulation22 to enable the Union to adopt unilateral measures in 
case a WTO Member losing WTO panel proceedings just aims at escaping a 
negative report by not accepting the EU contingent arbitration arrangement and 
appealing instead the contested panel report into the void -i.e. when the Appellate 
 
as facilitator of the WTO informal process on matters related to the functioning of the 
Appellate Body, who very recently delivered the draft for a General Council Decision aiming 
at gathering the positive consensus of the WTO membership to overcome the impasse 
(WT/GC/W/791, Draft Decision – Functioning of the Appellate Body, 28 November 2019; see 
also JOB/GC/222, Informal Process on Matters Related to the Functioning of the Appellate Body – 
Report by the Facilitator, H.E. Dr. David Walker (New Zealand), 15 October 2019).  
18 See Republic of Korea – Compliance with Obligations under Chapter 13 of the EU – Korea Free 
Trade Agreement, Request for Consultations by the European Union, 17 December 2018, and 
Republic of Korea – Compliance with Obligations under Chapter 13 of the EU – Korea Free Trade 
Agreement, Request for the establishment of a Panel of Experts by the European Union, 4 July 2019, 
available at the links trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/december/tradoc_157586.pdf and 
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/july/tradoc_157992.pdf, both accessed on 1 December 
2019. 
19 See the Note Verbale of the Delegation of the European Union in Kiev presented to the 
Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs requesting consultations under the EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement on 15 January 2019, and the Note Verbale of the Delegation of the 
European Union in Kiev presented to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs requesting 
the establishment of an arbitration panel under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement on 
20 June 2019, available at the links trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/ 
january/tradoc_157625.pdf and trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/june/tradoc_ 
157943.pdf, both accessed on 1 December 2019. 
20 See the Note Verbale of the Delegations of the European Union to the Kingdom of Lesotho, 
the Republic of Botswana, the Kingdom of Eswatini, the Republic of Namibia and the Republic 
of South Africa requesting consultations with the Southern African Custom Union (SACU) 
under the Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Southern 
African Development Community Member States (SADC), 14 June 2019, available at the link 
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/june/tradoc_157928.pdf, accessed on 1 December 
2019. 
21 For the presentation of the EU proposal for an interim appeal arbitration as well the 
indications of all the relevant documents see infra paragraph 3 of the present work. 
22 Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 
2014 concerning the exercise of the Union's rights for the application and enforcement of 
international trade rules and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 laying down 
Community procedures in the field of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the 
exercise of the Community's rights under international trade rules, in particular those 
established under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, in OJEU L 189/50 of 
27.6.2014. 
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Body cannot work because it has fewer than three judges, thus condemning the 
dispute to remain unsettled and suspended into a legal limbo.23 
The purpose of this article is to present the EU interim appeal arbitration 
arrangement, which is based on Article 25 of the DSU, the provision shaped 
during the Uruguay Round in order to make available for the WTO Members an 
arbitration mechanism as an alternative means of dispute settlement to facilitate 
the solution of certain WTO disputes. The present work will thus first provide an 
overview of arbitration proceedings in the history of the GATT 1947 system and 
under Article 25 of the DSU, also considering the only controversy where WTO 
Members had recourse to the alternative means of multilateral dispute settlement 
at issue, in the case US — Section 110(5) Copyright Act.24 Attention will then be 
devoted to the analysis of the EU interim appeal arbitration arrangement, for 
subsequently developing some final considerations on the chances of the EU 
contingency measure of being endorsed by a significant part of the WTO 
membership and thus representing an adequate interim mechanism capable of 
keeping the judicial review stage in the multilateral trade system while discussions 
continue to successfully overcome the blocking of the Appellate Body.  
2. Arbitration within the multilateral trade system: from GATT 1947 until 
Article 25 of the DSU 
Arbitration as a peaceful means for settling disputes has a long tradition in 
international inter-State dispute settlement mechanisms. The possibility of 
concurring in the selection of the adjudicators as well as the definition of the 
applicable law, and the guarantee of a binding award for resolving the controversy 
determined the success of arbitration proceedings among the disputants, because 
of their flexibility combined with the indispensable mandatory character of the 
final decision.25 Within the international trade law system, the Havana Charter 
contemplated the possibility for the contracting parties of resorting to arbitration, 
but it was only during the Uruguay Round that arbitration was formally 
 
23 See COM(2019) 623 final, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
concerning the exercise of the Union’s rights for the application and enforcement of international trade 
rules, Brussels, 12.12.2019. Cfr. also the Report by the European Commission on the EU 
Enforcement Regulation (COM(2019) 639 final, Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council – Review of the scope of the Regulation No 654/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 Brussels, 12 December 2019), together with the 
official press releases by the European Commission accompanying the proposal for 
strengthening the EU trade toolbox (Commission reinforces tools to ensure Europe’s interests in 
international trade, Brussels, 12 December 2019; Commission proposes new tools to enforce Europe’s 
rights in international trade, Brussels, 12 December 2019). For a first comment on the EU 
proposal for trade enforcement see Z. Radosavljevic, EU Leaders to Call for Strengthening of 
Trade Sanction Toolbox, Euractiv, 11 December 2019; S. Cho, Is the European Union Outsourcing 
Public International Law to Save the WTO Dispute Settlement System?, IELP Blog, 12 December 
2019.  
24 See WT/DS160/ARB25/1, United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyrights Act - Recourse 
to Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU, Award of the Arbitrators, 9 November 2001.  
25 See inter alia Y. Tanaka, The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2018, pp. 105-127 and the doctrine therein recalled. 
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introduced in the so called “Montreal Rules” or “Montreal Package,”26 
contemplating a provision very similar to what would become Article 25 of the 
DSU. In fact, paragraph E of the 1989 Improvements to the GATT Dispute 
Settlement Rules and Procedures established that “[e]xpeditious arbitration 
within GATT as an alternative means of dispute settlement can facilitate the 
solution of certain disputes that concern issues that are clearly defined by both 
parties,” and went on clarifying that resort to arbitration was to be “subject to 
mutual agreement of the parties which [had to] agree on the procedures to be 
followed,” notify of their arrangement to “all contracting parties sufficiently in 
advance of the actual commencement of the arbitration process” and consider as 
binding the arbitration award, while preserving the disputants’ discretion on the 
participation of other contracting parties to their arbitration proceedings.27 
Similarly, under Article 25 of the DSU WTO Member may employ 
“[e]xpeditious arbitration within the WTO as an alternative means of dispute 
settlement … [to] facilitate the solution of certain disputes that concern issues 
that are clearly defined by both parties.”28 The arbitration proceedings require the 
“mutual agreement of the parties,” which has to “be notified to all Members 
sufficiently in advance of the actual commencement of the arbitration process,” a 
transparency obligation aimed at allowing the WTO membership to know, 
consider and comment the WTO issues at the basis of the controversy, and thus 
also assess whether to become party to the arbitral alternative means of dispute 
settlement. A questionable aspect of Article 25 proceedings is the tighter 
treatment of third parties by comparison to the status conferred on them in DSU 
 
26 With these expressions are indicated the set of new rules developed for the multilateral 
dispute settlement mechanism during the Ministerial Meeting held in Montreal from 5 to 8 
December 1988, which was the mid-term review of the Uruguay Round. See Eric White, 
Reforming the Dispute Settlement System through Practice, in H. Hohmann (Ed.), Agreeing and 
Implementing the Doha Round of the WTO, Cambridge, 2010, p. 261 ff.  
27 GATT L/6489, Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, Decision 
of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 12 April 1989, in BISD 36S/61. On these historical 
aspects of arbitration within the multilateral trade system cfr. V. Hughes, Arbitration within 
the WTO, in F. Ortino, E.-U. Petersmann (Eds.), The WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995-
2003, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2004, p. 75 ff.   
28 Article 25.1 of the DSU. On arbitration proceedings under Article 25 of the DSU see L. 
Boisson De Chazournes, Arbitration at the WTO: A Terra Incognita to Be Further Explored, in S. 
Charnovitz, D.P. Steger, P. Van Den Bossche (Eds.), Law in the Service of Human Dignity: Essays 
in Honour of Florentino Feliciano, Cambridge, 2005, p. 181 ff.; D. Jacyk, The Integration of Article 
25 Arbitration in WTO Dispute Settlement: The Past, Present and Future, in Australian International 
Law Journal, 2008, p. 235 ff.; C.-fa Lo, The Shrinking Role of Article 25 Arbitration in DSU: A 
Proper Understanding of “Clearly Defined” Issues to Enhance Efficiency of WTO Dispute Settlement 
Procedure, in US-China Law Review, 2011, p. 879 ff.; B.H. Malkawi, Arbitration and the World 
Trade Organization – The Forgotten Provisions of Article 25 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, in Journal of International Arbitration, 2007, p. 173 ff.; P. Monnier, Working 
Procedures before Panels, the Appellate Body and Other Adjudicating Bodies of the WTO, in Law and 
Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 2002, pp. 481-538; R. Wolfrum, Article 25 DSU – 
Arbitration, in R. Wolfrum, P.T. Stoll, K. Kaiser (Eds.), WTO - Institutions and Dispute 
Settlement, Leiden / Boston, 2006, p. 566 ff. 
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panel and appellate disputes:29 in fact, pursuant to Article 25.3 of the DSU, 
“[o]ther Members may become party to an arbitration proceeding only upon the 
agreement of the parties which have agreed to have recourse to arbitration.” Such 
a limitation to the participation of third parties may be understood on general 
terms, i.e. in the light of the greater flexibility and discretion that DSU negotiators 
aimed to reserve to arbitration disputants. However, the multilateral and complex 
character of the WTO system, based on the principle of non-discrimination, 
demands for the constant possibility of participation of any interested WTO 
Member to the discussion, interpretation, litigation concerning a multilateral 
trade issue, an aspect fully understood by WTO adjudicators since the beginning 
of the functioning of the Marrakech dispute settlement mechanism when they 
applied the DSU provisions and shaped the procedural rules concerning third 
parties and third participants in panel and appellate proceedings.30  
Last but not least, Article 25.3 of the DSU confers automatic binding nature 
to the arbitration award, as “[t]he parties to the proceeding … [have to] agree to 
abide by” the latter. The arbitration award has also to be “notified to the DSB and 
the Council or Committee of any relevant agreement where any Member may raise 
any point relating thereto,” thus confirming that Article 25 rulings are part of the 
Marrakech case-law, which any WTO Member has the right to comment within 
the DSB or any other relevant WTO body. Finally, Article 25.4 of the DSU 
extends to the arbitration awards the remedies of the suspension of concessions or 
other obligations enshrined in Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU. 
So far, WTO Members resorted to the remedy of Article 25 of the DSU only 
once, and only for determining the amount of compensation due by the losing 
party because of its infringement of some TRIPs (Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights)31 obligations found by a panel report 
already approved by the DSB.32 In the US — Section 110(5) Copyright Act case, the 
disputants asked the arbitrators to establish the damage suffered by the EU 
because of the infringement by the US legislation of copyrights of European 
musicians and performers. This first -and up to now unique- Article 25 arbitration 
award authoritatively declared the kompetenz-kompetenz principle, recalling the 
Appellate Body finding in the US — 1916 Act (EC) case pursuant to which “it is a 
widely accepted rule that an international tribunal is entitled to consider the issue 
 
29 See Articles 10 and 17.4 of the DSU, Appendix 3 of the DSU on the Working Procedures 
for panels, and Rule 24 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review (WT/AB/WP/6, 
cit.).   
30 On the role for third parties and third participants in WTO litigation developed in particular 
by the case-law of the Appellate Body see E. Baroncini, L’approccio inclusivo dell’Organo 
d’appello dell’OMC per una giurisprudenza informata, partecipata, ed aperta, in Liber Amicorum 
Angelo Davì, La vita giuridica internazionale nell’età della globalizzazione, Vol. III, Napoli, 2019, 
p. 1767 ff.  
31 The text of the TRIPs Agreement is available in World Trade Organization, The Legal 
Texts - The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, cit., p. 321 ff.  
32 Panel Report, United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R, adopted 
27 July 2000. 
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of its own jurisdiction on its own initiative.”33 The WTO arbitrators therefore 
stated that “[i]n the absence of a multilateral control over recourse to [Article 25 
of the DSU] … it is incumbent on the Arbitrators themselves to ensure that [such 
provision] is applied in accordance with the rules and principles governing the 
WTO system.”34  
While recourse to arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU remained 
confined, within the WTO practice, to the just reported case, the importance and 
value of this alternative means for settling disputes emerged in the mid of the 
institutional crisis caused by the blocking of the AB members’ appointment due to 
the US approach. Various scholars started to suggest recourse to the use of 
arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU “as a temporary avenue to enable appeals 
of panel reports.”35 The EU developed a very effective formula of bilateral 
arbitration arrangement modelled on Article 25 of the DSU, a formula which may 
be easily endorsed by any willing WTO Member. The continuation of the present 
work will thus be devoted to the analysis of the EU interim appeal arbitration, 
which could represent a most effective tool to temporarily overcome the 
impossibility to adjudicate of the WTO Appellate Body. 
3. The Interim Appeal Arbitration Agreement based on Article 25 of the 
DSU proposed by the European Union 
In May 2019, it was reported by the specialized press that the EU was planning 
to propose the use of arbitration proceedings under Article 25 of the DSU to 
provide a temporary solution to the AB crisis.36 The European Commission was 
in fact preparing an arbitration model under Article 25 of the DSU, which would 
have been the basis of negotiations to be launched with other WTO Members after 
having obtained the mandate to lead such consultations from the EU Council.37 
The latter, in the configuration “Foreign Affairs – Trade Issues,” endorsed the 
European Commission’s approach on 27 May 2019, declaring that “[a]s regards 
 
33 Appellate Body Report, United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US — 1916 Act (EC)), 
WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R, adopted 26 September 2000, para. 54, 
34 WT/DS160/ARB25/1, United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, Award of the 
Arbitrators, 9 November 2001, para. 2.1. On this award see G.M. Grossman, P.C. Mavroidis, 
US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, Recourse 
to Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU: Would’ve or Should’ve? Impaired Benefits Due to 
Copyright Infringement, in World Trade Review, 2003, p. 281 ff.  
35 S. Andersen, T. Friedbacher, C. Lau, N. Lockhart, J.Y. Remy, I. Sandford, Using Arbitration 
under Article 25 of the DSU to Ensure the Availability of Appeals, CTEI Working Papers CTEI-
2017-17, at p. 1. See also J. Bacchus, Saving the WTO’s Appeals Process, www.cato.org/blog,19 
October 2018; J. Hillebrand Pohl, Blueprint for a Plurilateral WTO Arbitration Agreement under 
Article 25 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, in D. Prévost, I. Alexovičocá, J. Hillebrand 
Pohl (Eds.), Restoring Trust in Trade, Liber Amicorum in Honour of Peter Van den Bossche, Oxford, 
2019, p. 139 ff.  
36 See World Trade Online, EU Moving Forward with WTO Appellate Body Backup Plan, 28 
May 2019. 
37 Cfr. Council of the European Union, doc. 9506/19, WTO Appellate Body, 20 May 2019. See 
also I. Dreyer, EU to Launch Talks for Alternative WTO Appellate Mechanism, Borderlex, 22 May 
2019. 
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the Appellate Body crisis … the EU should reach out to other WTO members to 
work on an interim solution that preserves the binding character and the two 
levels of adjudication of the WTO dispute settlement system.”38  
The draft text of the joint communication containing the WTO interim 
appeal arbitration agreement -already leaked by the media at the beginning of June 
2019-39 was presented by the European Commission at the EU Trade Policy 
Committee (Deputies) in early July 2019, and then immediately brought to the 
attention of the EU Council, who was invited to authorise that text.40 On 15 July 
2019, the EU “Agriculture and Fisheries” Council hence “endorsed a model 
communication relating to interim arrangements that the EU will seek to put in 
place to preserve its … [WTO] rights pending the resolution of the blockage of 
appointments to the WTO Appellate Body,” emphasising that “[t]hese 
arrangements will provide for arbitration, on the basis of Article 25 of the [DSU] 
… to decide on appeals from panel reports if, and as long as, the Appellate Body is 
non-operational due to the blockage of new appointments.”41 
As first partner with which to agree on the proposed joint communication, 
the EU chose Canada, because of their common “strong support for the 
multilateral trading system”42 and recognition of “the indispensable role that the 
World Trade Organization … plays in facilitating and safeguarding international 
rules-based trade.”43 At the 17th Bilateral EU-Canada Summit, held in Montreal 
on 17-18 July 2019, the two WTO Members therefore announced that they were 
“finalizing an interim appeal arbitration arrangement based on existing WTO 
rules which could apply until the WTO Appellate Body is able to hear new appeals 
again”44: it was thus possible for the European Commission to officially present in 
Geneva the “Interim Appeal Arbitration Pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU,” 
combined with its Annex on “Agreed Procedures,” as an agreement with Canada, 
 
38 EU Council Conclusions 9753/19, Outcome of the Council Meeting - 3695th Council meeting, 
Foreign Affairs - Trade issues, Brussels, 27 May 2019, at p. 3. 
39 See the post by Tom Miles, Chief Correspondent at the Reuters Geneva Bureau, dated 6 
June 2019, appeared as a comment to S. Charnovitz, The WTO Appellate Body Crisis: A Critique 
of the EU’s Article 25 Proposal, in IELP Blog, June 2019, at the link 
ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/06/the-wto-appellate-body-crisis-a-critique-of-the-eus-article-
25-proposal.html, accessed on 30 October 2019. 
40 See Council of the European Union, doc. 10905/19, WTO Appellate Body – Interim 
Arrangement – Endorsement, 5 July 2019. The EU procedure just described in the text 
represents the application of the “Arrangements for Non-Binding Instruments” agreed among 
the Secretary Generals of the Council, the Commission and the EEAS as a follow-up to the 
judgment of the EU Court of Justice in case C-660/13, Council of the European Union v European 
Commission, EU:C:2016:616. See Council of the European Union, doc. 15367/17, Follow up to 
Judgment in Case C-660/13 – Arrangements between Secretaries General on Non-Binding 
Instruments, 4 December 2017. 
41 EU Council Conclusions 11255/19, Outcome of the Council Meeting - 3708th Council meeting, 
Agriculture and Fisheries, Brussels, 15 July 2019, at p. 11. 
42 Canada-EU Summit Joint Declaration, July 17-18, 2019, Montreal, para. 12. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. See also L. Sevunts, Canada and EU Work on ‘Interim Fix’ to Save Global Trade Body, 
Radio Canada International, 18 July 2019. 
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notified to the WTO Secretariat on 25 July 2019.45 Subsequently, in September 
2019, the European Commission decided to confer the Commissioner in charge for 
Trade with the power “to adopt, on behalf of the Commission and under its 
responsibility, certain measures concerning the interim appeal arbitrations at the 
World Trade Organization,”46 i.e. to enter into bilateral arrangements to 
provisionally overcome the crisis of the blockage of the Appellate Body with any 
other willing WTO Member. The EU institution hence set up the necessary legal 
tools and framework for moving forward with the European strategy of 
preserving a two-tier quasi-judicial mechanism for the multilateral trade system 
in case the World Trade Court were stopped being operational on 11 December 
2019.47  
As already hinted, the EU/Canada arrangement, which was copy-pasted and 
also concluded with Norway on 21 October 2019,48 is composed of two parts: the 
“Interim Appeal Arbitration pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU,” and the “Agreed 
Procedures for Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU in Dispute DS X,” 
annexed to the first part of the bilateral understanding. The introductory section 
expresses the “utmost concern”49 of the EU and her partner because of “the 
enduring absence of consensus in the Dispute Settlement Body for the proposals 
made to fill the vacancies”50 of the World Trade Court, and formulates the joint 
political vision on which the “appeal arbitration procedure” is based, also codifying 
the basic principles having to characterize the interim Article 25 appeal 
arbitration. In the preambular part it is thus “acknowledg[ed] the successful 
contribution of the WTO dispute settlement system to the security and 
predictability of the multilateral trading system,”51 and reaffirmed the 
commitment of the contracting parties “to a multilateral rules-based trading 
system;”52 the “role of the Appellate Body within the WTO dispute settlement 
 
45 JOB/DSB/1/Add.11, Statement on A Mechanism for Developing, Documenting and Sharing 
Practices and Procedures in the Conduct of WTO Disputes – Interim Appeal Arbitration Pursuant to 
Article 25 of the DSU, Communication circulated at the request of the Delegations of Canada 
and the European Union, 25 July 2019. Paragraph 8 of the EU/Canada agreed procedures for 
arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU was slightly modified on 21 October 2019 by the 
WTO document JOB/DSB/1/Add.11/Rev.1. 
46 PV(2019) 2306 final, European Commission, Minutes of the 2306th meeting of the Commission 
held in Brussels (Berlaymont) on Wednesday 4 September 2019 (morning), at p. 10. 
47 See European Commission Adopts Mandate to Extend Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement, 
Brussels, 4 September 2019. 
48 JOB/DSB/1/Add.11/Suppl.1, Statement on A Mechanism for Developing, Documenting and 
Sharing Practices and Procedures in the Conduct of WTO Disputes - Interim Appeal Arbitration 
Pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU, Communication circulated at the request of the Delegations 
of the European Union and Norway, 21 October 2019; see also EU and Norway Agree in Interim 
Appeal System in Wake of World Trade Organization Appellate Body Blockage, Brussels, 21 
October 2019. 
49 JOB/DSB/1/Add.11/Rev.1, Interim Appeal Arbitration pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU, cit., 
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system”53 is considered “essential,”54 thus coherently underlining “the urgency and 
importance of filling the vacancies on the Appellate Body so that it can carry on 
its functions as envisaged by the DSU;”55 and it is finally and consistently declared 
the determination of the two contracting parties “to preserve the essential 
principles and features of the WTO dispute settlement system which include its 
binding character and the two levels of adjudication through an independent and 
impartial appellate review of panel reports.”56 The joint communication therefore 
clearly states the provisional nature of the appeal arbitration procedure: the latter 
may be used only in the case that the Appellate Body will not be able “to hear 
appeals of panel reports in any future dispute between [the third country] and the 
European Union due to an insufficient number of its members;”57 and the interim 
Article 25 arbitration has “to replicate as closely as possible all substantive and 
procedural aspects as well as the practice of Appellate Review pursuant to Article 
17 of the DSU,”58 foreseeing also “the provision of appropriate administrative and 
legal support to the arbitrators by the Appellate Body Secretariat.”59 As a 
guarantee that the “substantive and procedural aspects” of the WTO appellate 
procedures are observed in the interim Article 25 arbitration, the bilateral 
agreement establishes that the arbitrators of the interim procedure will be 
“selected by the Director General from the pool of available former members of 
the Appellate Body,”60 also clearly declaring that recourse to the appeal arbitration 
procedure “will cease … as soon as the Appellate Body is again fully composed.”61 
In the Annex, the specific procedures for the interim Article 25 arbitration are 
considered. Once again it is clearly stated that “[t]he arbitration may only be 
initiated if the Appellate Body is not able to hear an appeal in [the dispute at hand] 
under Article 16.4 and 17 of the DSU,”62 a situation which “is deemed to arise where, 
on the date of issuance of the final panel report to the parties, there are fewer than 
three Appellate Body members.”63 Before the circulation of the final panel report to 
the WTO membership, any party may start the interim appeal arbitration procedure 
by requesting the panel to suspend panel proceedings for 12 months pursuant to 






57 JOB/DSB/1/Add.11/Rev.1, Interim Appeal Arbitration pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU, cit., 
para. 1. 
58 JOB/DSB/1/Add.11/Rev.1, Interim Appeal Arbitration pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU, cit., 
para. 2. 
59 Ibid. 
60 JOB/DSB/1/Add.11/Rev.1, Interim Appeal Arbitration pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU, cit., 
para. 3. 
61 JOB/DSB/1/Add.11/Rev.1, Interim Appeal Arbitration pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU, cit., 
para. 6. 
62 JOB/DSB/1/Add.11/Rev.1, Agreed Procedures for Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU in 
Dispute DS X, cit., para. 2. 
63 Ibid. 
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the panel proceedings,”64 the Notice of Appeal has to be filed with the WTO 
Secretariat. Such Notice of Appeal “shall include the final panel report in the official 
languages of the WTO,”65 and has to be “simultaneously notified to the other party 
and to the third parties in the panel proceedings.”66 Furthermore, the Annex 
establishes that “[t]hird parties which have notified the DSB of a substantial 
interest in the matter before the panel pursuant to Article 10.2 of the DSU may 
make written submissions to, and shall be given an opportunity to be heard by, the 
arbitrator,”67 applying mutatis mutandis Rule 24 of the Working Procedures for 
Appellate Review.68 In this way, the EU interim appeal arbitration procedure 
overcomes the problematic aspect highlighted above on Article 25.3 of the DSU, 
where the latter provides that the disputants have the power to decide on the 
participation of other WTO Members to the arbitration proceedings: by 
introducing the obligstion of accepting in advance the presence of third parties, the 
EU appeal arbitration maintains the important inclusive institutional feature of the 
role of third parties characterizing panel and AB adjudicatory activities.69 Paragraph 
9 of the Agreed Procedures clarifies another fundamental aspect of the interim 
appeal arbitration, i.e. that such appeal, similarly to what foreseen for the Appellate 
Body by Article 17.6 of the DSU, “shall be limited to issues of law covered by the 
panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel,”70 so that “[t]he 
arbitrators may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the 
panel.”71 Last but not least, it is foreseen that the findings of the panel report which 
have not been appealed through the interim arbitration will become binding because 
those panel findings “shall be deemed to form an integral part of the arbitration 
award,”72 and that awards issued under the interim appeal arbitration procedure 
“shall be deemed to constitute Appellate Body reports adopted by the DSB for the 
purposes of interpretation of the covered agreements.”73 Of course, the Annex 
reiterates the immediate binding nature of the arbitration award, as the parties agree 
to observe the latter and consider it final, and also have the duty to notify it “to the 
DSB and to the Council or Committee of any relevant agreement,”74 where any 
WTO Member has the right to deliver statements on any aspect of the award. 
 
64 JOB/DSB/1/Add.11/Rev.1, Agreed Procedures for Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU in 
Dispute DS X, cit., para. 5. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 JOB/DSB/1/Add.11/Rev.1, Agreed Procedures for Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU in 
Dispute DS X, cit., para. 11.  
68 See WT/AB/WP/6, cit. 
69 See supra, paragraph 2. 
70 JOB/DSB/1/Add.11/Rev.1, Agreed Procedures for Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU in 
Dispute DS X, cit., para. 9. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 JOB/DSB/1/Add.11/Rev.1, Agreed Procedures for Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU in 
Dispute DS X, cit., para. 8. 
74 JOB/DSB/1/Add.11/Rev.1, Agreed Procedures for Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU in 
Dispute DS X, cit., para. 10. 
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4. Reactions of the WTO membership to the EU ad hoc arbitration proposal 
Geneva trade experts announced that the EU interim appeal arbitration proposal, 
beyond Canada and Norway, could be accepted by other WTO Members such as 
Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Japan and Turkey, developed and 
developing countries sharing with the EU the view of the need to “continue to rely 
on binding dispute settlement in future,”75 and the overall positive assessment of 
the Appellate Body’s activity in shaping and preserving a multilateral trade system 
which is stable and predictable because it is rules-based and capable of issuing 
dispute settlement decisions that will be respected by both the disputants “as 
binding and final.”76 The Chinese Ambassador to the WTO, in particular, just on 
the eve of the Appellate Body’s paralysis, has already declared that “Beijing is 
actively working to support the EU’s vision of an appeal-arbitration model.”77 
The EU proposal thus seems to be gradually persuading different major 
actors of the multilateral trade system. Should the net of bilateral appeal 
arbitration arrangements start to persistently win the favour of various WTO 
Members, a sort of de facto plurilateral dispute settlement agreement could 
materialize. Such an important outcome could gain diplomatic space for the 
discussions to reform the DSU and thus make the Appellate Body operational 
again, and would be smoothly achieved, overcoming all the legal difficulties of 
setting up a formal plurilateral agreement on dispute settlement within the WTO 
legal framework,78 as well as the political and legal perplexities on the legitimate 
feasibility of a treaty of “The Real Friends of Dispute Settlement” outside the 
multilateral trade system.79 Furthermore, the EU choice to base her interim 
arbitration solution on the existing mechanism contemplated in Article 25 of the 
DSU, combined with the already-in-force WTO Working Appellate Procedures80 
and Rules of Conduct,81 allows avoiding the thorny issue of which procedural rules 
would be advisable to choose to guarantee WTO compatible proceedings and 
awards.82 What’s more, by recalling that the interim Article 25 arbitration has “to 
replicate as closely as possible all substantive and procedural aspects as well as the 
practice of Appellate Review pursuant to Article 17 of the DSU,”83 and expressly 
foreseeing that awards issued under the interim appeal arbitration procedure have 
 
75 See T. Miles, EU, Canada Agree First Workaround to Avoid U.S. Block on WTO Judges, Reuters 
Business News, 25 July 2019. 
76 Ibid. 
77 B. Baschuk, China May Back EU’s Trade-Dispute ‘Plan B’ as Trump Hobbles WTO, Bloomberg, 
10 December 2019. 
78 On these aspects cfr. Q. Kong, S. Guo, Towards a Mega-Plurilateral Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism for the WTO?, in Journal of World Trade, 2019, p. 273 ff. 
79 See P.J. Kujiper, From the Board: The US Attack on the WTO Appellate Body, in Legal Issues of 
Economic Integration, 2018, p. 1 ff., in particular at pp. 10-11. 
80 WT/AB/WP/6, cit. 
81 WT/DSB/RC/1, Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, 11 December 1996. 
82 See A. Hazarika, P. Van Vaerenbergh, “One Rule to Rule Them All”: Rules for Article 25 DSU 
Arbitration, in Journal of International Arbitration, 2019, p. 595 ff. 
83 JOB/DSB/1/Add.11/Rev.1, Interim Appeal Arbitration pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU, cit., 
para. 2. 
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to be “deemed to constitute Appellate Body reports adopted by the DSB for the 
purposes of interpretation of the covered agreements,”84 the EU interim 
arbitration arrangement preserves and strengthen the consideration -and respect- 
of the most appreciated WTO case-law, together with its harmonious and further 
constructive development. 
5. Conclusions 
In the very delicate institutional crisis triggered by the United States on the 
Appellate Body composition -appearing as most peculiar since the World Trade 
Court “has over the years served as a point of reference in different academic and 
policy debates about efficient institutional design for international dispute 
resolution”-85 the EU proposal for an interim appeal arbitration expresses without 
doubt high technical quality capable of attracting the WTO Members most 
committed to maintaining and strengthening the rule of law in the multilateral 
trade system also through a two-tier level of adjudication. While it seems unlikely, 
at least in the short time, to assist to a favourable approach by Washington to the 
EU initiative, the EU Interim Appeal Arbitration Pursuant to Article 25 of the 
DSU could nevertheless provide for vital diplomatic space to fix the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism, or devise ex novo a new multilateral legal framework, thus 
preserving the principle of cooperation as the central pillar of the international 
governance necessary for a free and fair global economy.  
The US approach seems more and more characterized by the intent of 
disarticulating the WTO jurisdictional pillar, as most recently witnessed by the 
US decision to introduce drastic cuts in the WTO budget for the expenses of the 
functioning of the Appellate Body.86 Nonetheless the EU is showing the strongest 
determination “to preserve its rights as enshrined in the WTO Agreements, 
notably the right to an appeal review,” and thus not to renounce to “a rules based 
multilateral trading system,” considering that such approach is “owe[d] … to our 
citizens and our businesses, because it is them, ultimately, that benefit from the 
 
84 JOB/DSB/1/Add.11/Rev.1, Agreed Procedures for Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU in 
Dispute DS X, cit., para. 8. 
85 J. Lam, WTO AB as a Model for Other Adjudicatory Bodies – The Case of EU’s Investment Court 
System, in C. Lo, J. Nakagawa, T. Chen (Eds.), The Appellate Body of the WTO and its Reform, 
Heidelberg, 2019, p. 331 ff. 
86 Originally threatening to veto the entire 2020 WTO budget, the US administration 
conditioned its endorsement to the latter to the acceptance by the rest of the WTO 
membership of drastic cuts of the Appellate Body’s expenses: “[t]he deal limits annual 
spending for appellate body members to no more than 100,000 francs, an 87% reduction from 
the full allotment, and caps spending by the body’s operating fund to 100,000 francs, a 95% 
reduction” (B. Baschuk, WTO Members Agree on a 2020 Budget, Averting Jan. 1 Shutdown, 
Bloomberg, 5 December 2019). See also the statement of the US Ambassador Dennis Shea on 
Appellate Body members’ compensation delivered at the DSB meeting of 22 November 2019: 
Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body Delivered by 
Ambassador Dennis Shea, U.S. Permanent Representative to the World Trade Organization, Geneva, 
November 22, 2019, available at the link geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/ 
uploads/sites/290/Nov22.DSB_.Stmt_.as-deliv.fin_.public.pdf, accessed on 16 December 
2019. For a comment, cfr. M. Becker, Might Makes Right? Donald Trump Damages America By 
Defanging WTO, Spiegel online, 10 December 2019. 
Elisa Baroncini  Saggi – DPCE online, 2019/4 
ISSN: 2037-6677 
2328 
system.”87 The greatest attention has therefore to be reserved to the constructive 
initiatives proposed by the EU, as the latter is the world’s largest trading block 
and the expression of a process of a unique political integration which, in spite of 
its current internal challenges, could well advance a most significant contribution 
for governing international trade with transparent, inclusive and fair mechanisms 




87 Statements by the European Union at the WTO General Council Meeting, 9-10 December 2019, 
available at eeas.europa.eu/delegations/world-trade-organization-wto/71834/statements-
european-union-wto-general-council-meeting-9-10-december-2019_en, accessed on 16 
December 2019. 
